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Abstract
Background: Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of social coalitions and alliances (i.e.,
long-lasting coalitions) and their impact on individual power. Understanding the dynamics of alliance formation and its
consequences for biological, social, and cultural evolution is a formidable theoretical challenge. In most great ape species,
coalitions occur at individual and group levels and among both kin and non-kin. Nonetheless, ape societies remain
essentially hierarchical, and coalitions rarely weaken social inequality. In contrast, human hunter-gatherers show a
remarkable tendency to egalitarianism, and human coalitions and alliances occur not only among individuals and groups,
but also among groups of groups. These observations suggest that the evolutionary dynamics of human coalitions can only
be understood in the context of social networks and cognitive evolution.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we develop a stochastic model describing the emergence of networks of allies
resulting from within-group competition for status or mates between individuals utilizing dyadic information. The model
shows that alliances often emerge in a phase transition-like fashion if the group size, awareness, aggressiveness, and
persuasiveness of individuals are large and the decay rate of individual affinities is small. With cultural inheritance of social
networks, a single leveling alliance including all group members can emerge in several generations.
Conclusions/Significance: We propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for studying the dynamics of alliance
emergence applicable where game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our approach is both scalable and expandable. It is
scalable in that it can be generalized to larger groups, or groups of groups. It is expandable in that it allows for inclusion of
additional factors such as behavioral, genetic, social, and cultural features. Our results suggest that a rapid transition from a
hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers (often referred to as ‘‘egalitarian revolution’’)
could indeed follow an increase in human cognitive abilities. The establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances
creates conditions promoting the origin of cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals.
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Introduction
Coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) are often
observed in a number of mammals including hyenas, wolves, lions,
cheetahs, coatis, meerkats, and dolphins [1]. In primates, both kin
and non-kin, and both within-group and group-level coalitions are
a very powerful means of achieving increased reproductive success
via increased dominance status and access to mates and other
resources [1–7]. In humans, coalitions occurs at many different
levels (ranging from within-family to between-nation states) and
represent probably the most dominant factor in social interactions
that has shaped human history [8–15].
The evolutionary forces emerging from coalitionary interactions
may have been extremely important for the origin of our
‘‘uniquely unique’’ species [16,17]. For example, it has been
argued that the evolution of human brain size and intelligence
during Pleistocene was largely driven by selective forces arising
from intense competition between individuals for increased social
and reproductive success (the ‘‘social brain’’ hypothesis, also
known as the ‘‘Machiavellian intelligence’’ hypothesis; [16–27]).
Coalition formation is one of the most powerful strategies in
competitive interactions and thus it should have been an
important ingredient of selective forces acting in early humans.
Moreover, one can view language as a tool that originally emerged
for simplifying the formation and improving the efficiency of
coalitions and alliances. It has also been argued that the
establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances in early
human groups should have created conditions promoting the
origin of conscience, moralistic aggression, altruism, and other
norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals [28].
Increasing within-group cohesion should also promote the group
efficiency in between-group conflicts [29,30] and intensify cultural
group selection [31].
In spite of their importance for biological, social and cultural
evolution, our understanding of how coalitions and alliances are
formed, maintained and break down is limited. Existing theoretical
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cooperative game theory, economics, and operations research
[32–35]. These approaches are usually limited by consideration of
coalitions of two individuals against one, focus on conditions under
which certain coalitions are successful and/or profitable and assume
(implicitly or explicitly) that individuals are able to evaluate these
conditions and join freely coalitions that maximize their success [36–
44]. As such, they typically do not capture the dynamic nature of
coalitions and/or are not directly applicable to individuals lacking
the abilities to enter into binding agreements and to obtain, process,
and use complex information on costs, benefits, and consequences of
different actions involving multiple parties [45]. These approaches
do not account for the effects of friendship and the memory of past
events and acts which all are important in coalition formation and
maintenance. Other studies emphasize the importance of Prisoner’s
Dilemma as a paradigm for the emergence of cooperative behavior
in groups engaged in the public goods game [46,47]. These studies
have been highly successful in identifying conditions that favor the
evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in the face of
incentives to cheat. Prisoner’s Dilemma however is often not
appropriate for studying coalitionary behavior [48,49] especially
when individuals cooperate to compete directly with other
individuals or coalitions [16,17] and within-coalition interactions
are mutualistic rather than altruistic and the benefit of cooperation is
immediate. The social network dynamics that result from coalition
formation remain largely unexplored.
Here, we propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for
studying the dynamics of alliance emergence applicable where
game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our method is related
to recent models of social network formation and games on graphs
with dynamic linking [50–55]. In our novel approach, alliances are
defined in a natural way (via affinity matrices; see below) and
emerge from low-level processes. The approach is both scalable
and expandable. It is scalable in that it can be generalized to larger
groups, or groups of groups, and potentially applied to modeling
the origin and evolution of states [11–15,56,57]. It is expandable
in that it allows for inclusion of additional factors such as
behavioral, genetic, social, and cultural features. One particular
application of our approach is an analysis of conditions under
which intense competition for a limiting resource between
individuals with intrinsically different fighting abilities could lead
to the emergence of a single leveling alliance including all
members of the group. This application is relevant with regard to
recent discussions of ‘‘egalitarian revolution’’ (i.e. a rapid transition
from a hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of
human hunter-gatherers, [10]), and whether it could have been
triggered by an increase in human cognitive abilities [16,17].
Methods
We consider a group of N individuals continuously engaged in
competition for status and/or access to a limited resource.
Individuals differ with regard to their fighting abilities Si
(1,i,n). The attitude of individual i to individual j is described
by a variable xij which we call affinity. We allow for both positive
and negative affinities. Individual affinities control the probabilities
of getting coalitionary support (see below). The group state is
characterized by an N6N matrix with elements xij which we will
call the affinity matrix.
Time is continuous. Below we say that an event occurs at rate r
if the probability of this event during a short time interval dt is rdt.
We assume that each individual gets engaged in a conflict with
another randomly chosen individual at rate a which we treat as a
constant for simplicity. Each other member of the group is aware
of the conflict with a constant probability v. [Note that the value
of v can be affected both by the external environment and by
biological and/or social characteristics of individuals.] Each
individual, say individual k, aware of a conflict between individuals
i and j (‘‘initiators’’), evaluates a randomly chosen initiator of a
conflict, say, individual i, and helps him or not with probabilities hki
and 12hki, respectively. In the latter case, individual k then evaluates
the other initiator of the conflict and helps him or not with
probabilitieshkjand 12hkj,respectively.Wenote that thecoalitionary
support may be vocal rather than physical [58]. The interference
probability hij is given by an S-shaped function of affinity xij and is
scaled by two parameters: b and g. A baseline interference rate b
controls the probability of interference on behalf of an individual the
affinity towards whom is zero; b can be viewed as a measure of
individual aggressiveness (i.e., the readiness to interfere in a conflict)
orpersuasiveness(i.e.,theabilityto attracthelp).Aslopeparameterg
controls how rapidly the probability of interference increases with
affinity. In numerical simulations we will use function
hij~ 1z
1{b
b
exp {gxij
  
   {1
:
Notice that the probability of help hij changes from zero to b to
one as affinity xij changes from large negative values to zero to
large positive values. Below we will graphically illustrate the group
state using matrices with elements hij which we will call
interference matrices.
For simplicity, we assume that interference decisions are not
affected by who else is interfering and on which side. We also
assume that individuals join coalitions without regard to their
probability of winning. This assumption is sensible as a first step
because predicting the outcomes of conflicts involving multiple
participants and changing alliances would be very challenging for
apes and hunter-gatherers.
As a result of interference, an initially dyadic conflict may
transform into a conflict between two coalitions. [Here, coalition is a
group of individuals on the same side of a particular conflict.] The
fighting ability SI of a coalition I with n participants is defined as s ¯nn
2,
where s ¯n is the average fighting ability of the participants. This
formulation follows the classical Lanchester-Osipov square law [59–
61] which captures a larger importance of the size of the coalition
over the individual strengths of its participants. The probability that
coalition I prevails over coalition J is set to SI/(SI+SJ).
Following a conflict resolution we update the affinities of all
parties involved by a process analogous to reinforcement learning
[62]. The affinities of winners are changed by dWW, of the losers by
dLL, the affinities of winners to losers by dWL, and those of losers to
winners by dLW. The d-values reflect the effects of the costs and
benefits of interference on future actions. It is natural to assume
that the affinities of winners increase (dWW.0) and those of
antagonists decrease (dWL,0, dLW,0). The change in the affinities
of losers dLL can be of either sign or zero. Parameters dWW, dWL,
dLW, dLL are considered to be constant. We note that a negative
impact of costs of interfering in a conflict on the probability of
future interferences can be captured by additionally reducing the
affinities of coalition members to its ‘‘initiator’’ by a fixed value d.
We assume that coalitions are formed and conflicts are resolved
on a time-scale much faster than that of conflict initiation. Finally,
to reflect a reduced importance of past events relative to more
recent events in controlling one’s affinities, we assume that
affinities decay towards zero at a constant rate m [63]. Table 1
summarizes our notation.
Alliance Formation
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To gain intuition about the model’s behavior we ran numerical
simulations with all affinities initially zero. We analyzed the
structure of the interference matrix hij, looking for emerging
alliances. We say individuals i and j are allies if their interference
probabilities hij and hji both exceed the baseline interference rate b
by at least 50%. An alliance is a connected network of allies.
We also measured a number of statistics including the average
and variance of affinities, the proportion of individuals who belong
to an alliance, the number and sizes of alliances, the average
interference probabilities h ¯ for all alliances present, and the
clustering coefficients C
(1) and C
(2) [64] related to the probability
that two allies of an individual are themselves allies. The average
interference probability and the clustering coefficients can be
interpreted as measuring the ‘‘strength’’ of alliances.
To make interpretation of model dynamics easier, we computed
the proportion Xi of conflicts won since birth, and the expected
social success Yi=Sbk/Ai, where Ai is the age of individual i, the
sum is over all conflicts k he has participated in, the benefit bk is 1/
nk if i was a member of a winning coalition of nk individuals, and bk
is 0 if i was on the losing side. Although in our model the
probability of winning always increases with the coalition size, the
benefit bk always decreases with the coalition size. The net effect of
the alliance size on the expected benefits of its members will
depend on the sizes and composition of all alliances in the group.
Note that our interpretation of Yi as a measure of expected social
success makes sense both if all members on the winning side share
equally the reward or if the spoils of each particular conflict goes to
a randomly chosen member of the winning coalition. The former
may be the case when the reward is an increase in status or rank.
The latter may correspond to situations similar to those in baboons
fighting over females, where members of the winning coalition
may race to the female and whoever reaches her first becomes the
undisputed consort for some time [48]. Non-equal sharing of
benefits can be incorporated in the model in a straightforward
way. Note also that being a member of a losing coalition always
reduces relative social success.
We also calculated the standard deviations HX and HY of Xi and
Yi values. These statistics measure the degree of ‘‘social inequality’’
in the group.
Figure 1 illustrates some coalitionary regimes observed in
simulations using a default set of parameters (a=1, b=0.05,
dWW=1, dLL=0.5, dWL=20.5, dLW=20.5, g=0.5, v=0.5,
ma=0.05) unless noted otherwise. This figure shows the N6N
interference matrices using small squares arranged in an N6N array
with each of the squares color-coding for the corresponding value of
hijusingthegrayscale.Thesquaresonthediagonalarepaintedblack
for convenience. In all examples, individual strengths si are chosen
randomly and independently from a uniform distribution on [0,10]
resulting in strong between-individual variation.
Emergence of alliances
In our model, the affinity between any two individuals is
reinforced if they are on a winning side of a conflict and is
decreased if they are on the opposite sides; all affinities also decay
to zero at a constant rate. The resulting state represents a balance
between factors increasing and decreasing affinities. Although the
emergence of alliances is in no way automatic, simulations show
that under certain conditions they do emerge. The size, strength,
and temporal stability of alliances depend on parameters and may
vary dramatically from one run to another even with the same
parameters. However, once one or more alliances with high values
of C
(1), C
(2) and h ¯ are formed, they are typically stable. Individuals
belonging to the same alliance have very similar social success
which is only weakly correlated with their fighting abilities. That is,
the social success is now defined not by the individual’s fighting
ability but by the size and strength of the alliance he belongs to.
Individuals from different alliances can have vastly different social
success, so that the formation of coalitions and alliances does not
necessarily reduce social inequality in the group as a whole.
Phase transition
We performed a detailed numerical study of the effects of
individual parameters of the properties of the system. As expected,
increasing the frequency of interactions (which can be achieved by
increasing the group size N, the awareness probability v, baseline
interference rate b, or the slope parameter g) and reducing the
affinity decay rate m all promote alliance formation. Most
interestingly, some characteristics change in a phase transition-like
pattern as some parameters undergo small changes. For example,
Figure 2 show that increasing N, v, b, g, or decreasing m result in a
sudden transition from no alliances to at least one very strong
alliance with all members always supporting each other. Parameter
dLL has a similar but less extreme effect, whereas parameters dWL
and dLW have relatively weak effects (Figures S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6,
S7 and S8). Similar threshold-like behavior is exhibited by the C
(2)-
measure, the average probability of help h ¯ within the largest
alliance, the number of alliances, and the numbers of alliances with
C
(1).0.5 and with h ¯.0.5 (see Figures S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7 S8,
S9 and S10). Interestingly, formation of multiple alliances is
hindered when affinities between individuals fighting on the same
side decrease as a result of losing (i.e., if dLL,0).
Table 1. A summary of variables, parameters, functions, and
statistics.
Main dynamic variables
xij affinity of individual i to individual j
Parameters
N group size
si fighting ability of individual i
a conflict initiation rate
v awareness
b baseline interference rate
g slope parameter
dWW, dWL, dLW, dLL changes in affinity after conflict resolution
m affinity decay rate
k strength of social network inheritance
c birth rate
Variables, functions, and statistics
hij probability that individual i helps individual j; is given
by an S-shaped function of affinity xij with parameters b
and g
SI=s ¯n
2 strength of coalition I with n members and average
fighting ability s ¯
SI/(SI+SJ) probability that coalition I wins a conflict with coalition J
Xi proportion of conflicts won by individual i since birth
Yi=Sbk/Ai expected social success of individual i; Ai is the age of
individual i and bk is the benefit of the kth conflict
HX, HY standard deviations of Xi and Yi in the group
C
(1), C
(2), h ¯ clustering coefficients and the average probability of help
in an alliance
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.t001
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Next, we extended the model to larger temporal scales by
allowing for birth/death events, and the cultural inheritance of
social networks. New individuals are born at a constant rate c.
Each birth causes the death of a different randomly chosen
individual. We explored two rather different scenarios of cultural
Figure 1. Interference matrices at time 1000. This figure shows the NxN interference matrices using small squares arranged in an NxN array with
each of the small squares color-coding for the corresponding value of hij using the gray scale from 0 (white) to 1 (black). The diagonal elements set to
black for convenience so that the smallest squares on the diagonal represent unaffiliated individuals. For display purposes, alliances are ordered
according to their clustering coefficients so that stronger alliances occur first along the diagonal. Parameters have default values except where noted.
For each parameter combination shown are matrices observed in five different runs. (a) N=10. (b) N=20. (c) N=30. (d) N=20, dLL=20.5. (e) N=20,
m=0.1. (f) N=20, v=0.25.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.g001
Figure 2. Tukey plots for the effects of N, v, b, g, dLL on the C
(1) measure of the largest alliance. Each graph shows the effect of changing a
single parameter from its default value (results for each parameter value are averaged over 20 runs, using data from time 1000 to 2000). The vertical
lines extend from minimum to maximum observations, the dashed lines depict averages, and the boxes extend from lower to upper quartiles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.g002
Alliance Formation
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its parent who is chosen among all individuals with a probability
proportional to the rate of social success Yi. This scenario requires
special social bonds between parents and offspring. In the second,
each new individual inherits affinities of its ‘‘role model’’ (chosen
from the whole group either with a uniform probability or with a
probability proportional to the rate of social success Yi). Under
both scenarios, if individual i
* is an offspring (biological in the first
scenario or cultural in the second scenario) of individual i, then we
set xi*j=kxij for each other individual j in the group (parameter
0,k,1 controls the strength of social network inheritance). In the
parent-offspring case, the affinities of other individuals to the
offspring are proportional to those to the parent: xji
1~kxji and
xi
1i~xii
1 is set to k times the maximum existing affinity in the
group. In the role model case, other individuals initially have zero
affinities to the new member of the group: xji
1~0.
Stochastic equilibrium
If cultural inheritance of social networks is weak (k is small), a
small number of alliances are maintained across generations in
stochastic equilibrium (see Figure 3). This happens because the
death of individuals tends to decrease the size of existing alliances
while new individuals are initially unaffiliated and may form new
affinities. This stochastic regime is similar to coalitionary structures
recently identified in a community of wild chimpanzees in Uganda
[6] and in populations of bottlenose dolphins in coastal waters of
Western Australia [65] and eastern Scotland [66].
Egalitarian state
If cultural inheritance of social networks is faithful (k is large),
the dynamics become dramatically different due to intense
selection between different alliances.
Now the turnover of individuals creates conditions for growth of
alliances. Larger alliances increase in size as a result of their
members winning more conflicts, achieving higher social success,
and parenting (biologically or culturally) more offspring who
themselves become members of the parental alliance. As a result of
this positive feedback loop (analogous to that of positive frequency-
dependent selection), the system exhibits a strong tendency
towards approaching a state in which all members of the group
belong to the same alliance and have very similar social success in
spite of strong variation in their fighting abilities. Figure 4 contrasts
an egalitarian state with the stochastic equilibrium illustrated in
Figure 3 above. One can see that at the egalitarian state, the
average affinity is increased while the standard deviation of affinity
and the hierarchy measures are decreased. Although at the
egalitatian state the correlation of individual strength and social
success can be substantial, it does not result in social inequality.
This ‘‘egalitarian’’ state can be reached in several generations.
Cycling
However, the egalitarian state is not always stable. Under
certain conditions the system continuously goes through cycles of
increased and decreased cohesion (Figure 5a–c) in which the
egalitarian state is gradually approached as one alliance eventually
excludes all others. But once the egalitarian state is established (in
Figure 5d, around time 5200), it quickly disintegrates because of
internal conflicts between members of the winning alliance.
Figure 5d illustrates one such cycle, showing that the dominant
alliance remains relatively stable as long as the group excludes at
least one member (‘‘outsider’’).
Analytical approaches
Simple ‘‘mean-field’’ approximations help to understand model
dynamics. These approximations focus on the average a and
variance v of affinities computed over particular coalitions (see Text
S1). For example, at an egalitarian state when all individuals have
veryhigh affinity to eachother,the dynamics of a and v are predicted
to evolve to particular stochastic equilibrium values, a
* and v
*.T h e
egalitarian state is stable if the fluctuations of pairwise affinities
around a
* do not result in negative affinities. We conjecture that the
egalitarian state is stable if a
1w3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v
1 p
, which is roughly equivalent to
(a
*)
2.10v
*, which in turn can be rewritten as
2v2
m
w10
vard
d d
2 z1{v2
  
:
Here the mean d and variance vard are computed over the four d-
coefficients. Both the approximations and numerical simulations
suggest that the egalitarian state cannot be stable with negative d.
Increasing the population size N,a w a r e n e s sv,a v e r a g ed,a n d
decreasing the affinity decay rate m and variance vard all promote
stability of the egalitarian state. The agreement of numerical
simulations with analytical approximations is very good given the
stochastic nature of the process. Similar approximations can be
developed for other regimes. In particular, one can show (see Text
S1) that the stabilizing effect of ‘‘outsiders’’ on the persistence of
alliances is especially strong in small groups. This happens because
successful conflicts against outsiders simultaneously increase the
average a and decrease the variance v of the within-alliance affinities,
with both effects being proportional to 1/N.
Figure 3. An example of the dynamics of an interference matrix in a stochastic equilibrium with no cultural inheritance (k=0).
Parameters values are default with N=20 and c=0.001 (so that the average life span is 1000). See the legend of Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.g003
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The overall goal of this paper was to develop a flexible
theoretical framework for describing the emergence of alliances of
individuals able to overcome the power of alpha-types in a
population and to study the dynamics and consequences of these
processes. We considered a group of individuals competing for
rank and/or some limiting resource (e.g., mates). We assumed that
individuals varied strongly in their fighting abilities. If all conflicts
were exclusively dyadic and no coalitionary support was provided,
a hierarchy would emerge with a few strongest individuals getting
most of the resource [67–70]. However there is also a tendency
(very small initially) for individuals to interfere in an ongoing
dyadic conflict thus biasing its outcome one way or another.
Positive outcomes of such interferences increase the affinities
between individuals while negative outcomes decrease them.
Using a minimum set of assumptions about cognitive abilities of
individuals, we looked for conditions under which long-lasting
Figure 4. The graphs in the first column (Figures a, c and e) correspond to the run shown in Figure 3 (with k=0) which resulted in a
small number of alliances maintained in stochastic equilibrium. The graphs in the second column (Figures b, d and f) correspond to a run
with k=1 (complete cultural inheritance of social network) and m=0.025 (increased memory of past events) which resulted in an egalitarian regime.
With several alliances present simultaneously (Figures a, c and e), the average affinity a is small, the variance of affinities v is large, the measures of
social inequality HX and HY are large, and the correlation between social success Yi and individual fighting ability si is small. In the egalitarian state
(Figures b, d and f), the average affinity a is large, the variance of affinities v is small, the measures of social inequality HX and HY are small, and the
correlation between social success Yi and individual fighting ability si is large.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.g004
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an outcome is promoted by increasing the frequency of
interactions (which can be achieved in a number of ways) and
decreasing the affinity decay rate. Most interestingly, the model
shows that the shift from a state with no alliances to one or more
alliances typically occurs in a phase-transition like fashion. Even
more surprisingly, under certain conditions (that include some
cultural inheritance of social networks) a single alliance comprising
all members of the group can emerge in which the resource is
divided evenly. That is, the competition among nonequal
individuals can paradoxically result in their eventual equality.
We emphasize that in our model, egalitarianism emerges from
political dynamics of intense competition between individuals for
higher social and reproductive success rather than by environ-
mental constraints, social structure, or cultural processes. In other
words, within-group conflicts promote the buildup of a group-level
alliance. In a sense, once alliances start to form, there is no other
reasonable strategy but to join one, and once social networks
become highly heritable, a single alliance including all group
members is destined to emerge.
Few clarifications are in order. First, in our model coalitionary
interactions are mutually beneficial to all members of a coalition
rather than altruistic (see ref.71 for a discussion of relevant
terminology). We note that outside of humans there are not many
examples of altruistic behavior towards genetically unrelated
individuals without some direct fitness benefits present [72] with
some of those that were initially suggested to be altruistic under
closer examination turning out to be kin-directed or mutualistic
[45,73]. Even in humans certain behaviors that are viewed as
altruistic may have a rather different origin. For example, food
sharing may have originated as a way to avoid harassment, e.g. in
the form of begging [45]. In any case, modern human behavior is
strongly shaped by evolved culture [31] and might not be a good
indicator of factors acting during its origin. Second, in our model
we avoided the crucial step of the dominant game-theoretic
paradigm which is an explicit evaluation of costs and benefits of
certain actions in controlling one’s decisions. In our model,
coalitions and alliances emerge from simple processes based on
individuals using only limited ‘‘local’’ information (i.e., informa-
tion on own affinities but not on other individuals’ affinities) rather
than as a solution to an optimization task. Our approach is
justified not only by its mathematical simplicity but by biological
realism as well. Indeed, solving the cost-benefit optimization tasks
(which require rather sophisticated algebra in modern game-
theoretic models) would be very difficult for apes and early
humans [45] especially given the multiplicity of behavioral choices
and the dynamic nature of coalitions. Therefore treating coalitions
and alliances in early human groups as an emergent property
Figure 5. An example of a coalitionary cycle with complete cultural inheritance (k=1). Other parameters are as in Figure 3. (a) Average
(blue) and standard deviation (red) of affinities in the group. (b) Number of alliances (blue) and clustering coefficient C
(1) for the largest alliance (red).
(c) Proportions of individuals belonging to an alliance (red) and to the largest alliance (blue). (d) Dynamics of the interference matrix between time
4100 and 7200.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293.g005
Alliance Formation
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more realistic approach. We note that costs and benefits can be
incorporated in our approach in a straightforward manner. Third,
one should be careful in applying our model to contemporary
humans (whether members of modern societies or hunter-gathers).
In contemporary humans, an individual’s decision on joining
coalitions will be strongly affected by his/her estimates of costs,
benefits, and risks associated as well as by cultural beliefs and
traditions. These are the factors explicitly left outside of our
framework.
Our results have implications for a number of questions related
to human social evolution. The great apes’ societies are very
hierarchical; their social system is based on sharp status rivalry and
depends on specific dispositions for dominance and submission. A
major function of coalitions in apes is to maintain or change the
dominance structure [1,3]; although leveling coalitions are
sometimes observed (e.g., [2]), they are typically of small size
and short-lived. In sharp contrast, most known hunter-gatherer
societies are egalitarian [8–10]. Their weak leaders merely assist a
consensus-seeking process when the group needs to make
decisions; at the band level, all main political actors behave as
equal. It has been argued that in egalitarian societies the pyramid
of power is turned upside down with potential subordinates being
able to express dominance because they find collective security in a
large, group-wide political coalition [10]. One factor that may
have promoted transition to an egalitarian society is the
development of larger brains and better political/social intelli-
gence in response to intense within-group competition for
increased social and reproductive success [16,17,25,27]. Our
model supports these arguments. Indeed, increased cognitive
abilities would allow humans to maintain larger group sizes, have
higher awareness of ongoing conflicts, better abilities in attracting
allies and building complex coalitions, and better memories of past
events. The changes in each of these characteristics may have
shifted the group across the phase boundary to the regime where
the emergence of an egalitarian state becomes unavoidable. [This
discussion implies that the values of parameters characterizing
cognitive abilities of apes and humans are located on different sides
of the critical values identified above. Whether this assumption is
justified is an important empirical question.] Similar effect would
follow a change in mating system that would increase father-son
social bonds, or an increase in fidelity of cultural inheritance of
social networks. The fact that mother-daughter social bonds are
often very strong suggests (everything else being the same) that
females could more easily achieve egalitarian societies. The
establishment of a stable group-wide egalitarian alliance should
create conditions promoting the origin of conscience, moralistic
aggression, altruism, and other cultural norms favoring the group
interests over those of individuals [28]. Increasing within-group
cohesion will also promote the group efficiency in between-group
conflicts [29] and intensify cultural group selection.
In humans, a secondary transition from egalitarian societies to
hierarchical states took place as the first civilizations were
emerging. How can it be understood in terms of the model
presented here? One can speculate that technological and cultural
advances made the coalition size much less important in
controlling the outcome of a conflict than the individuals’ ability
to directly control and use resources (e.g., weapons, information,
food) that strongly influence conflict outcomes. In terms of our
model, this would dramatically increase the variation in individual
fighting abilities and simultaneously render the Lanchester-Osipov
square law inapplicable, making egalitarianism unstable.
Besides developing a novel and general approach for modeling
coalitionary interactions and providing theoretical support to some
controversial verbal arguments concerning social transitions
during the origin of humans, the research presented here allows
one to make a number of testable predictions. In particular, our
model has identified a number of factors (such as group size, the
extent to which group members are aware of within-group
conflicts, cognitive abilities, aggressiveness, persuasiveness, exis-
tence of outsiders, and the strength of parent-offspring social
bonds) which are predicted to increase the likelihood and size of
alliances and affect in specific ways individual social success and
the degree of within-group inequality. Existing data on coalitions
in mammals (in particular, in dolphins and primates) and in
human hunter-gatherer societies should be useful in testing these
predictions and in refining our model.
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